Psychoanalysis, Metaphor, and The Concept of Mind by Hopkins, Jim
Psych met
Psychoanalysis, Metaphor, and the Concept of Mind
Jim Hopkins
Freud's work has made it possible for us to extend thinking involving such concepts as desire, belief, and 
phantasy, and in a way which there is good reason to take as at least partly sound. In what follows I 
consider how this same work also extends thinking involving symbolism and metaphor, and how in this 
psychoanalysis is consilient with recent work on conceptual metaphor. The main example concerns the 
way we think about the mind. I argue that we can see such thinking as an important part of our concept of 
mind, and try, following Wittgenstein, to show how it provides an approach to the mind-body problem. 
1. Symbolic mapping in psychoanalysis. 
The development of the psychoanalytic view of the mind went hand in hand with the idea that much 
everyday mental life can be seen as informed by something like metaphor or symbolism. To see this let us 
take it that we begin with an understanding of intentional action as prompted (caused) by desire: we 
assume that successful action on a desire that P (e.g. that I get a drink) should bring it about that P (that I 
get a drink), so that the desire is satisfied; and this in turn should bring it about that the agent experiences 
or otherwise comes to believe that P (that I have got a drink), so that the desire is pacified, that is, ceases 
to govern action. We thus tacitly assume that the operation of desire is partly regulated by experience or 
belief, that is, by a form of representation of the situation in which desire is satisfied. 
Freud's work indicates the regulation of desire by representation extends far beyond the case of 
intentional action. His discussions of dreams and symptoms, for example, enable us to see them as forms 
of representation which serve to regulate desires (or wishes) in the absence of any real satisfying 
situation. We can readily see this in the simple case in which someone thirsty dreams he is drinking, for 
here we have a desire that P (that I get a drink) which is temporarily pacified by an experience- or belief-
like representation that P (I dream that I get a drink), without actual recourse to water. 
In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud showed that the same pattern was to be found in more complex 
cases as well. Thus (p 106ff) his apparently non-wishful dream that his patient Irma was suffering from a 
toxic injection given by his colleague Otto could be seen as representing the satisfaction of, and thereby 
pacifying, a desire not to be responsible for Irma's continued suffering, which had been roused by a 
comment from Otto the day before, which Freud had taken as critical. In representing Otto as giving toxic 
injections, moreover, Freud seems also to have been pacifying a connected wish which originated years 
before: a wish not to have been responsible for the death of a patient by a toxic drug which he had 
administered, and that of a friend who had died as a result of injections of cocaine, which drug Freud had 
recommended to him. The pacification of a contemporary and potentially conscious desire concerning 
Irma went with together with that of deeper and presumably more painful desires originating from the 
past. 
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Although the point is often missed, Freud's analysis of this dream can also be seen to support a distinct 
claim about representation in his waking life. In understanding the dream as representing the fulfilment of 
Freud's wish not to be responsible for the deaths of his injection-killed friend and patient, we take the 
figure of Irma in the manifest content of the dream to stand for, and so in this sense to symbolize, these 
other figures. But then it is also plausible to hold that these same relations -- relations of one figure 
standing for others -- also serve to explain aspects of Freud's waking motives and actions. For seeing that 
Irma stood in Freud's mind for these significant figures from the past apparently enables us to understand 
not only why he dreamt about her as he did (e.g. in terms of toxic injections) but also why in his waking 
life he reacted so strongly to Otto's comment about her, and with an attempt to justify his treatment of her 
(by writing up her case history) which preceded the fantastic elaboration of the same theme in his dream. 
Freud's analysis, that is, also suggests that the waking significance which Irma held for Freud before the 
dream was partly derived from that of the past figures and situations for which, as consideration of the 
dream showed, she stood in his mind. 
The same applies to Freud's analyses of other dreams in which one person stands for another. So we can 
regard Freud's first extensions of commonsense psychology as providing tacit support for an idea about 
the significance we attach to persons and situations in daily life: present significant figures and situations 
partly inherit their meaning from past ones, to which they are unconsciously mapped. The role which such 
across-time and across-situation mapping could play was made clearer in further work. Thus consider the 
female patient discussed in the Introductory Lectures (1915, p 261-3). Her obsessional symptoms 
included a compusion to run repeatedly into a neighboring room, take up a particular postition beside a 
table, and ring for the maid, who after this -- the obsessional action completed -- had to be fobbed off with 
some pointless errand. 
This patient, who was unhappily separated from her husband, related her symptom to her wedding night. 
Her husband had run repeatedly but unsuccessfully into her room try to have intercourse; and to avoid 
feeling ashamed before the maids he had faked a bloodstain on the sheets, but in the wrong place. This 
showed a series of links between the particulars of the symptom and the wedding night, which was 
completed when the patient took Freud to the table in front of which she stood, and explained that she 
took up her position in front of it in such a way that the maid could not fail to see a stain which was a 
prominent feature of the cloth. Thus in her symptomatic activity she was representing her wedding night, 
and pacifying her wish that things had been different then by showing the maid the stain which (stood for 
the earlier stain which) would have made clear that her marriage had been consummated. 
2. Symbolic representational pacification 
In this example there are both mappings between present and past persons, and also the less direct and so 
more recognizably symbolic instances of a table standing for a bed, a tablecloth for a sheet, and a stain 
from eating for a stain from sexual activity. These relations made it possible for a present intentional 
action (ringing for a maid and standing in a certain way) to provide representational pacification for 
desires relating to a situation long past. Such relations can also be seen in the transference, in which the 
analysand unconsciously maps past objects and situations on to the person and situation of the analyst, so 
that present activities again acquire a clearly a significance as pacifying desires or wishes originating in 
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/Jim's/psychmet.html%20copy (2 of 18) [30/4/2004 11:25:48 am]
Psych met
the past which can easily be discerned. 
Freud also held that such symbolic relations were also naturally established over the course of a person's 
life. As early as 1895 he hypothesized a process of symbolic 'substitution': 
...When an old maid keeps a dog or an old bachelor collects snuffboxes, the former is finding a substitute 
for her need for a companion and the latter for his need for -- a multitude of conquests....this normally 
operating mechanism of substitution is abused in obsessional ideas... (p 209) 
Freud distinguished the mere setting up of a symbolic substitute for a past object of desire from the deeper 
process of transformation which he called sublimation, by which early sexual and aggressive motives 
obtained new and more acceptable objects. But post-Freudian work (see for example Segal 1957, 1978) 
indicates that these processes are best seen as intertwined. In consequence many analysts now regard 
symbol-formation as central to psychological development, and hence also to therapeutic success. 
Something of the life-pervading role of symbolism hypothesized on this way of thinking can be illustrated 
by the example of a relatively successful teacher and writer, who was surprised when one of his pupils -- 
who had made a special effort to be taught by him, and was trying hard to master his ideas -- offered to 
suck his penis. This offer was neither expected nor welcome, but that night the teacher dreamt that a lamb 
had come to suck milk from his finger.... On waking he realised that the lamb represented the pupil who 
had come to imbibe his ideas, and the milk-giving finger the penis his pupil had wanted to suck. So the 
dream could be seen as representing the fulfilment, in a form more acceptable because symbolic, of a 
sexual wish which had arisen on the day before. 
The symbolism, however, went deeper, for the dream also represented him in the position of a mother 
nursing a child. His finger/penis was fulfilling the role of a feeding breast, and his writing and teaching 
represented as the production of milk as well as semen. The dream thus also expressed early desires for a 
combination of male and female roles which was incoherent and impossible to actually to attain, and 
which did not govern the dreamer's mature waking life. But owing to the symbolic meaning which he 
attached to his work, these desires could nonetheless still be pacified through it. For in writing or teaching 
the dreamer could with some justice see himself in reality -- to use metaphors which are more familiar 
and indirect -- as potent, seminal, and providing others food for thought. 
Freud's work on symbolism and substitution thus made it possible to re-conceive desire in terms of an 
underlying continuity-in-difference which provides both a radically holistic perspective on the role of 
motive in the causation of action and a naturalistic description of the unconscious generation of present 
meaning from past experience. On this account the desires of childhood and infancy, while so unrealistic 
as commonly to be frustrated, are nonetheless not psychologically lost. Rather they are constantly re-
articulated by mapping to new objects and situations, so as to direct action towards their symbolic 
representational pacification during the rest of life. New goals therefore acquire significance as 
representatives of the unremembered objects of our first and most visceral passions; and the depth of 
satisfaction we feel in present accomplishments flows from their unacknowledged pacification of 
unknown desires from the distant past. 
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3. Symbolic mapping in conceptual metaphor. 
According to the ideas we have been considering our thought and action about a present situation is likely 
to be at least partly derived from motives related to past situations to which the present is unconsciously 
mapped. This bears comparison with some claims recently advanced by George Lakoff and a number of 
his colleagues (see Lakoff 1993). These writers argue that metaphor should not be seen merely as a 
linguistic device, but rather as a form of thinking which is widespread, systematic, and fundamental. 
Their claim is that we very often think about objects, properties, or relations in one domain (called the 
target domain) by systematically mapping these onto objects and properties in another domain (called the 
source domain). The correspondence relation between these domains constitutes a potentially large and 
organized conceptual metaphor, by means of which we think, or conceive, the one domain in terms of the 
other. 
Where the source domain is A and the target B, so that in mapping the domains we think of B in terms of 
A, we can speak of the B as A metaphor. Thus we seem to make use of a metaphor of relationship as 
journey. In this we use concepts of objects, properties, and relations from the domain of travel or journeys 
in order to conceptualize objects, properties, and relations in the domain of co-operative personal 
relationships, such as love. In doing this we systematically take persons in such relations to correspond to 
travellers, their particular relationship to the vehicle in which they are travelling, and their goals in the 
relationship to their destinations in travelling. Thus we may speak of such a relationship as going along 
well, slowing down, going nowhere, getting stuck, at a crossroads, at a dead end, and so on. 
In this metaphor, as in many others, the source domain in terms of which we think is intuitively more 
concrete than the target domain which we think about. Also we relate the domains tacitly, in the sense that 
we may be unaware both of using such correspondence relations, and of their richness and systematicity. 
Thus we may tacitly represent a relationship by one or another sort of vehicle, as seems appropriate to the 
rest of our thought. The relationship may be taking off (airplane); on the rocks(boat); off the rails (train); 
in the slow lane (car); and so on. A relationship which is taking off, say, will be one in which things are 
moving fast, and also getting better or more exciting, as in accord with such related metaphoric mappings 
as those of increase as upward motion (rising excitement, rising prices, rising in one's career, etc.) and 
better as higher (high status, high profile, high achiever, etc.) Thus it may be connected with the 
participants in the relationship feeling high on love, and so forth. 
Further, as our understanding of familiar words enables us to form and understand new sentences, so our 
understanding of familiar correspondence relations enables us to form and understand new instances of 
metaphor. Thus, to take another of Lakoff's examples, in hearing a song lyric like 'We're driving in the 
fast lane on the freeway of love', we are immediately able to understand the metaphor in terms of the 
relationship-as-journey mapping, and others associated with it. The vehicle (relationship) is going fast, 
and this again is connected with excitement (fast cars, fast women); this speed, moreover, is compared to 
fast driving, which may be reckless or dangerous, and so lead to a crash in which someone will be hurt; 
the idea that the road is a freeway links with the idea of sexual freedom, free love, and so on. Such 
understanding ordinarily remains tacit, but in making it explicit we realize that it is already latent in our 
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/Jim's/psychmet.html%20copy (4 of 18) [30/4/2004 11:25:48 am]
Psych met
original response. 
We also reason in terms such mappings. We take it, for example, that if a relationship is stuck, those 
involved have reason to try to do something about this. They may try to start over or to get the 
relationship started again, or to get goingor going forward, once more. Towards this end they may, for 
example, try to get over the problem, or to find their way out of the difficulty. Alternatively they may 
decide that the relationship has broken down, or perhaps been wrecked by the actions of one or both of 
them, in which case they will get out and go their separate ways. 
Once we start to delineate such a metaphor, we can usually find additional examples, in which the 
hypothesized mapping serves to explain further responses we are aware of. Thus consider the phrase 
'spaceship earth'. Why do these words evoke the idea that human beings have a significant co-operative 
relationship in virtue of being inhabitants of a common planet? This is explicable on the hypothesis that 
the phrase constitutes an instance of the correspondence between relationship and vehicle in the 
metaphorical structure we have been discussing. The metaphor, as we might say using another from the 
same family, reminds us that we are all in the same boat, and so should pull together. Again, one might 
ask why the song which begins 'Trains, and boats, and planes, all bound for Paris, New York, and 
Rome...' should be so evocative of solitude and loneliness. Here also there seems a plausible answer, in 
terms of the same metaphor: these vehicles which the singer is not in, going on journeys which the singer 
is not taking, represent relationships in which the singer, sadly, has no part. Such individual instances 
may not be particularly convincing one by one, but each mapping of the kind we are taking seems to 
generate a class of examples which is open and readily extensible, and which thus has considerable 
cumulative weight. 
Students of conceptual metaphor have tried to show in detail how tacit mappings of this kind permeate 
our thinking about a great range of topics, including time and space, objects, events, and properties, 
logical and semantic categories, and the pursuit of human goals. They have also stressed how the ultimate 
source domain for many of these mappings is the human body (see particularly Johnston 1987). This 
work thus bears out William James's claim that 
My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively determined, of 
my egoistic interests. Other objects may become interesting derivatively through association with any of 
these things, either as means or as habitual concomitants; and so in a thousand ways the primitive sphere 
of the egoistic emotions may enlarge and change its boundaries. (1980, Vol 1, 324) 
4. Pschyoanalytic findings about symbolic mapping complement those of conceptual metaphor, and 
link them with concrete thinking. 
The psychoanalytic hypotheses about symbolism sketched in section I complement these claims. 
Psychoanalysis is mainly concerned with the relations between past and present phantasies and desires, 
but takes these to be mediated by mappings which can be regarded as cognitive and metaphorical. Thus in 
the symptom of the table-cloth lady above, we find not only a cross-time mapping as between past and 
present, but also a cross-domain mapping as between eating and sexual activity (the mapped roles of bed 
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and table, sheet and table-cloth, and the origins of the stains). The same domains, again, are mapped in 
the teacher's dream above, in which nutritive represents sexual sucking. Indeed an extensive metaphorical 
connection between eating and sexual activity seems part of the representational practice of every culture. 
In representing many domains, according to psychoanalysis, we map them to relations to or among 
persons (object-relations), and our representations of present object-relations partly map them to past 
ones. The ultimate source for these mappings are therefore object-relations in childhood and infancy, 
which begin with those involving emotionally significant parts of the body and their functions. Both 
disciplines thus see conscious thought as underlain and informed by a system of mappings linking distinct 
objects and domains, a principle source of which is the human body. 
Psychoanalysts and students of conceptual metaphor also conceive faulty symbolic/metaphoric thinking 
in ways which are closely related. Such thinking, as we have seen, maps objects, events, and properties 
across times and domains; and the sources of such mappings are often more concrete or basic, or more 
closely related to the human body, than the targets. It is therefore a requirement for such thinking that the 
source and target domains be both appropriately connected to, and appropriately differentiated from, one 
another. If sources are not appropriately connected with their targets they cannot be used to represent 
them; and if they are connected but not differentiated from their targets the one may be confused with the 
other. In both cases -- that in which the source of a would-be metaphor is not linked with a target, and that 
in which a source is confused with a target -- the metaphor is likely to be understood in terms of its 
source, and hence too concretely. 
According to psychoanalytic theory as well as much psychological and psychiatric observation, such 
failures of source-target relations are shown in a number of psychological disturbances characterized by 
concrete thinking. For example Segal (1957) describes a concert violinist, who during a schizophrenc 
breakdown refused to play his violin. When asked why he replied 'Do you expect me to masturbate in 
public?' This can be understood in terms of two hypotheses: (i) that the significance of the man's violin 
playing was partly determined by a symbolic/metaphoric connection with earlier activity involving his 
own body, and (ii) that he had ceased to differentiate the source and target domains of this mapping. To 
take a different example, a ten-year-old autistic girl showed catastrophic anxiety when a nurse, about to 
do a blood test, said 'Give me your hand; it won't hurt.' She calmed down immediately when another 
person said 'stretch out your index finger'. She had apparently understood the nurse as requesting her to 
give her hand away, so that she would not have it afterwards. This too seems a case of concrete thinking, 
but one which may not require to be understood in terms of a collapse of source and target domains. 
Rather it may be that the girl simply understood 'give' in terms of the domain of the giving of objects from 
one person to another, and had not effected any further mapping. 
Lakoff represents the maintenance of correct source/target relations in terms of what he calls the 
Invariance Principle. This principle, as he says, 
...explains why you can give someone a kick, even if that person doesn't have it afterward, and why you 
can give someone information, even if you don't lose it. This is a consequence of the fact that inherent 
target domain structure automatically limits what can be mapped. (1993, p 215-6) 
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To think that someone given a kick would possess that kick afterwards would be to fail properly to 
distinguish the source domain of physical objects transfered from one person to another in givings, from 
the target domain of kickings of one person by another. As in the examples above, this failure might arise 
either from confusion between source and target, or from an initial failure to use the source to map the 
target. Lakoff's invariance principle thus also marks the natural avoidance of concrete thinking which is 
characteristic of normal symbolic/metaphorical thought. 
4. Metaphoric representation and the concept of mind: the metaphor of the mind/body container. 
If metaphorical thinking is as important a part of our cognitive repertoire as analysts and students of 
conceptual metaphor claim, then we should be able to understand significant aspects our concepts in 
terms of it. I think that this holds for aspects of the concept of mind which have been particularly 
important for both philosophy and psychology, namely those which generate the problem of other minds 
and the problem of consciousness. We can begin to consider this by reviewing a family of 
metaphoric/symbolic mappings which represent the mind as a container, where the container in question 
might also be taken as the body. We can call this the metaphor of the mind/body container. 
Some examples are particularly simple and direct, as when we say that a stupid or forgetful person -- one 
who cannot keep things in mind -- has a hole in his head. Others involve a variety of further comparisons. 
One familiar instance, for example, involves comparing the mind to the inhabitant of a house. There is a 
joke in which we knock on the forehead of an inattentive or vacant person, asking if anyone is at home. 
(There is also a children's game along the same lines, which even very little children instantly understand 
and enjoy.) Again, when a person's mind is not present, in one way or another, we may say that the lights 
are on(the eyes are open) but there is no one at home. Likewise we speak of the house of reason; of the 
mind as housed in the body; of the eyes as windows of the soul, the senses the doors of perception, portals 
of the mind, and so forth. 
Metaphors from this family appear in very many contexts, as when we say that someone who has failed to 
keep something concealed has spilled the beans i.e. let them spill out of his mind/body container, and in a 
way that makes them difficult or impossible to replace. They are, however, particularly common in our 
conceptualisation of emotion and feeling (Kovecses 1990). Thus we speak of people as full of feelings of 
all kinds, which may bubble up, well up, or overflow, unless they are kept contained. We take it that if a 
person's feelings are bottled up then he or she should perhaps seek to express them, or let them out in one 
way or another, say by channelling them into to an activity like art or exercise, venting them by talking to 
an acquaintance, or even taking them out on the cat, or something of the kind. Otherwise the pressure of 
feeling may be damaging or dangerous. 
A number of the variants of this metaphor are highly detailed and systematic. Thus, for example, we seem 
to conceive certain emotions as fluids in the mind/body container. We think of anger, for example, as a 
hot fluid: the feelings of someone who is angry may seethe or simmer and so are agitated. A person who 
is hot under the collar in this way may be fuming as the anger rises, or wells up in him; and so he may 
have to simmer down, or cool down, so as not to boil over. If he can't do this, and doesn't somehow 
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manage to let off steam he may be at risk of bursting with anger, or exploding with rage. The spectrum of 
feeling between calmness and uncontrollable anger is thus represented relatively strictly in terms of the 
temperature of the emotion-liquid, which may be cool (no anger), agitated or hot (some degree of anger), 
or boiling (great anger). By contrast a source of fear may make one get cold feet or make one's blood run 
cold, so that, in the extreme case, cold fear or icy terror may render one frozen to the spot and so unable 
to move. Here the opposition in the nature of the feelings in marked by one in the properties of the 
metaphorical fluids to which we map them. 
Where we take the mind/body container as enclosing feelings, we also take it that emotionally significant 
events may affect the container itself. This happens when we become frozen to the spot, for in this case 
the coldness of the contents of the mind/body container are represented as affecting (immobilizing) the 
bodily container. The container can be put at risk from within, from the kind of eruption in which 
someone blows his top, flips his lid, or blows his stack. The container can also suffer damage which 
originates outside, as when a person is crushed, shattered, or broken. Particularly serious is the kind of 
episode in which a person cracks up in such a way that the mind/body container is entirely fragmented. 
Such involuntary fragmentation is quite different from the small and precisely controlled exchange, in 
which we give another a piece of our mind. In this case we are relieved of our aggression, which is 
metaphorically passed on to the other, who has now to cope with it. This is different from the case in 
which a person goes to pieces so completely as to lose his mind. 
Our taking the mind/body as a container has a further aspect, which is that we liken good things to those 
we would like to take into the container, particularly by eating, and bad things to those which should be 
put or kept out, and by processes which include excretion. Thus, in general, we regard good things as 
sweet : life is sweet, youth is sweet, peace is sweet, and so, according to our way of speaking, are hope, 
freedom, victory, revenge, nothings whispered in the ear, people's faces, a moment's relief, dreams, babies 
(whom one could sometimes just gobble up, because they are so sweet and delightful), children 
(particularly little girls, who as we know are made of sugar and spice), young animals, melodies both 
heard and unheard, and an endless variety of other things. 
The idea of having good things in the container also applies to other persons in the environment. Those 
whom we love, for example, we keep in mind, keep in our memories, and keep in our heart; and this -- 
strikingly -- goes with a capacity actually to feel the other as a represented and valued presence somehow 
inside us, as if they had in some sense actually been internalized. Hence also the characterization of things 
which are good or desirable as things we would like to eat is especially striking in the case of love and 
lust. Terms of endearment include numerous variations on honey, sugar, sweetness, and the like; she or he 
may be the cream in my coffee, the sugar in my tea, my sweetie-pie, and so on. There are also variants of 
these expressions which extend to coarser appetites, such as that for cheesecake or beefcakeor meat; and 
one can want to meet a dish or a hunk, or take an interest in very many other bodily things compared to 
food. This is another aspect of the metaphorical comparison between nutrition and sexuality, which also 
appears fleetingly in the symptom of the table-cloth lady and the dream of the successful teacher above. 
As indicated, we often represent communication of thought and feeling in terms of actual or attempted 
transfer of things from container to container. The eyes can be used to transfer the temperature of 
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emotion, for example, as when they set one alight (afire, aflame, etc.), or when one is frozen by an icy 
look or a cold stare. Again, opinions and sentiments are put into words -- which can therefore be full of 
meaning, not, say, hollow or empty -- and thus given to others (passed to them, exchanged with them, 
etc.) who may or may not receive, or take them in. This kind of transfer of thought or feeling can also 
affect the mind/body container towards which it is directed: just as another's words may convey or carry 
things from their container to ours, so their words or deeds may strike us, and they may penetrate, pierce, 
perforate, cut, sting, lacerate, lash, or otherwise attack or injure the mind/body container. One may be 
stabbed by a sharp look, as by sharp words, even if the person is not looking daggers at one; and looks 
and words may also be acid, poisonous, or full of venom. Also the mind can be entered, or threatened 
with entry, in other ways which are connected with bodily entry, as when someone gets under our skin, 
gets up our nose, or again bugs us like some insect intruding on the body. 
Since we represent what is in the mind/body container as having great power to affect it, the question of 
what we take in from what others attempt to put across is highly significant. We seem to regard various 
forms of truth as providing food for thought, and hence intellectual nourishment, and various forms of 
falsehood in an opposite way. Just as we systematically relate anger or fear to metaphorical internal 
fluids, so we systematically relate the badness of various kinds of misrepresentation to the unpleasantness 
or toxicity of the materials in terms of which we represent them. Thus we may hold that bad ideas or 
opinions are tosh, trash, rubbish, garbage, or even horse manure or bullshit, and we characterize their 
sources in related ways. If someone's utterances or opinions are without substance we may say that they 
are just gassing. If someone regularly engages in bragging or other relatively harmless and self-inflating 
misrepresentation we may say that they are full of hot air. We may call someone who is fluent at minor 
misrepresentation a piss-artist; and someone prone to more serious or pernicious misrepresentation will be 
said to be full of piss, or, if the falsehood is still more noxious, full of shit. 
Likewise we may say that opinions which we characterize in this way stink, and regard them as 
distasteful, repellent, repulsive, disgusting or nauseating. Hence we hope that no one (or at least no one 
who is not some kind of sucker) will be inclined to swallow them. But people may imbibe such 
falsehoods in childhood, or be fed them through propaganda, in which case their minds may be infected 
or poisoned, without their being able to do anything about it. Contaminating , corrupting , or polluting 
others with ideas of this kind is decidedly not giving them the proper intellectualsustenance. Hence if 
people air such unsanitary views, or try to force such filth or junk into others' minds, or down their 
throats, they are at risk of being told to shove it, that is, to put these things back into the inner space of 
their own mind/body containers, and by a route which reflects their nature. 
This sample of our thought and talk can be taken to indicate that we have a metaphorical representation of 
the mind as a container, which we can diagram as follows: 
Figure 1: The metaphor of the mind as a container 
5. This metaphor is extensively used in unconscious representation of the mind. 
This too is continuous with that we find in psychoanalysis. Thus consider the following from Kohut's 
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(1977, p 105) accountof what he calls 'indescribable states of self-dissolution'. 
...Here are some examples taken at random from my psychoanalytic practice: a negligible crack in the 
plaster in one room might indicate the presence of a serious structural defect of the patient's house; a tiny 
skin infection of the patient or of someone he experiences as an extension of himself is the first sign of a 
dangerous septicaemia; or, in dreams, the frightening infestation of the living quarters with spreading 
vermin; or the ominous discovery of algae in the swimming pool. Much as these fears might occupy the 
patient's mind, however, leading to states of endless brooding, worry, or panic, these fears do not 
constitute the core of the disturbance, but have been generated as a result of the patient's attempt to give a 
circumscribed content to a deeper unnameable dread experienced when a person feels that his self is 
becoming seriously enfeebled or is disintegrating. The ability of the analyst to conceive of psychic 
conditions that cannot be described in terms of verbalizable meaning allows him to consider an important 
band in the spectrum of possibilities as he scrutinizes the analysand's anxiety -- the fragmentation of and 
the estrangement from his body and mind in space, the breakup of his sense of continuity in time. 
Although Kohut takes these examples 'at random', it is clear that they have something in common. The 
representations by which these patients register their dread that something is going seriously wrong with 
their selves are all versions of the metaphoric representation of the mind/body container described above. 
In each case -- the plaster cracking in the house, the living quarters invaded with vermin, the infected 
skin, the fluid-filled pool infested with algae -- the mind/body container and/or its contents are 
represented as threatened. So the states which Kohut regards as indescribable are nonetheless naturally 
expressed through what we have seen as a systematic metaphor, as instances in which the house of 
reason, or the fluids of emotion and feeling, are in one way or another endangered. 
This kind of metaphorical/symbolic representation of the self, moreover, is familiar from many other 
psychoanalytic sources. It has a clear role, for example, in the dream of Irma's injection. Freud remarks 
that the toxic solution which the dream represents Otto as having injected into Irma is in fact a chemical 
which he took to be involved in the sexual process, and that this was related to his having thought that 
Irma's problems were the result of her widowhood, and might be relieved by the accompaniments of 
marriage. (As he says in his letter in Abraham (1965), discussing the 'sexual megalomania' which he took 
to underlay the dream, 'There would be one simple therapy for widowhood, of course. All sorts of 
intimate things, naturally.') Thus the dream is constructed around a mapping as between the intellectual 
sexual solution which Freud was offering Irma, and the physical and toxic sexual solution, which Otto 
was portrayed as injecting into her mind/body container (using his own dirty syringe). 
6. This representation has also been assigned an important theoretical role. 
Owing to its clinical frequency, this representation of the mind also plays an important role in 
psychoanalytic theory. Freud described the mind as it appears in this kind of portrayal in terms of an 
'internal world', which he took to be related to 'the most basic instinctual impulses' of taking in and 
putting out (1940, p 205). This he described in terms of a 'bodily ego', which was 'ultimately derived from 
bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body' and so 'a mental projection of the 
surface of the body' (1923 p 26, authorized footnote). We may take this together with Freud's account of 
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/Jim's/psychmet.html%20copy (10 of 18) [30/4/2004 11:25:48 am]
Psych met
some aspects of early mental life, in which he says that our attitudes of acceptance and rejection as 
applied to thoughts are originally related to taking things into and out of the body. 
Expressed in the language of the oldest -- the oral -- instinctual impulses, the judgement is 'I should like 
to eat this', or 'I should like to spit it out'; and, put more generally: 'I should like to take this into myself 
and to keep that out.' That is to say: 'It shall be inside me' or 'It shall be outside me.' As I have shown 
elsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from 
itself everything that is bad (1925, p26). 
If we remember that this is said to be at the root of attitudes towards thoughts themselves, and take the 
space into which the good is introjected and bad expelled to be that established as inner by 'a projection of 
the surface of the body', we arrive at a representation of the mind which accords with the metaphoric 
picture as diagrammed above very closely. 
This representation has also figured extensively in post-Freudian thinking. Melanie Klein (1975) found 
such an internal world to be shown in a multiplicity of ways in the representational activities of little 
children, where it was related to the inside of the mother's body as well as the children's own; and Wilfred 
Bion (1967, 1977) made the role of containment for this world explicit in his discussions of container and 
contained. 
7. Multi-domain mapping. 
Although students of conceptual metaphor characteristically speak of cross-domain mapping, 
psychoanalytic instances often show mappings involving serveral domains at once. This is so, for 
example, in the dream of the successful teacher. For the dream showed not only a clear representation of 
sexual by nutritive sucking, but also a phantasy -- upon which the student also seems to have been acting -- 
that the teacher's knowledge could be internalized in this concrete way. Hence it also involved an instance 
of the mind/body container, and a particular form of concrete thinking about knowledge, the possibility of 
which is foreshadowed also in the metaphors (imbibing ideas, food for thought, etc.) noted above. (The 
same holds for the intellectual/sexual solution as represented in the dream of Irma's Injection.) 
This kind of multi-domain mapping frequently figures in phantasies of internalization, in which good 
things or persons are represented as taken into the self. This is particularly notable, for example, in 
representations involving the automobile. People very often represent themselves in terms of their cars, or 
their cars as extensions of themselves. (This seems to be one cause of road rage.) But cars are also 
vehicles, and so that travelling in them is also used to represent relationships to others. This, as well as the 
role of concrete thinking about the mind, is illustrated by the case of the 'mechanical boy' discussed by 
Bettelheim (1959, 1967). 
This little boy, diagnosed as autistic, was fascinated by machines of various kinds, and identified himself 
with them. He converted his bed, for example, into a complex car-machine that would 'run him' or 'live 
him': this included a carburettor which enabled him to breathe, a motor that ran his body, a 'speaker' that 
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enabled him to talk or hear, and so forth. In this he gave the clearest possible indications of the way he 
took this car as representing, and extending, his self; and this was also the topic of many of his drawings 
and other communications. But the symbolism was shown to have a further significance in an interview 
with the boy several years later. As he then said: 
I can remember being interested in mechanical and electrical things almost as far back as I can 
remember...I made a car...that's one of the main things I made out of the bed...it was something in which a 
person was enclosed...when I started coming closer to people...I'd have fantasies about a car or anything 
that moved on wheels that was enclosed and I'd have a fantasy that I was in it myself...I'd always picture 
that somebody else was in it with me...one person was Barbara, and it was right after I'd been here a year 
and a half that I had put up a device on my bed to make it [the bed] look like a car. I told her to get on the 
bed while I pretended to drive the car...on other occasions I pretended to drive home, you know, to where 
my family was. And mostly, I think, it was a way of thinking of the time when I would be living with my 
family and would trust people enough to want them. (1967, p 334) 
Here we see a double use of the metaphors we have considered. The car was an enclosed space which by 
which the little boy represented his self, and into which he wanted to bring those he might trust and relate 
to, as in accord with the metaphor of the mind as container; but as a vehicle it also provided an instance of 
the metaphor with which we began, that of relationship as journey. In this case, however, the metaphor 
was used concretely: wanting to ensure and extend the functioning of his self, and also to form 
relationships, the boy actually constructed an enclosed space which was also a vehicle, as if thereby 
constructing a relating self. As he later realized, however, this was not a way of bringing such things 
about, but rather 'a way of thinking' -- a form of thinking in terms of metaphor or symbolism -- of 
relationships which he might yet form. His improvement went with a recognition of the symbolic nature 
of what he had previously confused with the real. 
It is now widely recognized that many individuals diagnosed as autistic have difficulty in employing the 
commonsense concept of mind. Most work in this field (Baron-Cohen et al 1993; Baron-Cohen 1995) has 
concentrated on the understanding of propositional attitudes like belief. It seems, however, that there may 
also be significant difficulty in employing the conception of the mind as a container, which is a focus in 
psychoanalytic treatments of autism. Workers in this field often quote the example of an observant 
autistic youth who said 'People talk to each other with their eyes...What is it that they are saying?' (Frith 
1993) The discussion above indicates the extent to which we articulate the language of the eyes via the 
metaphor of the mind as a container. Lack of the capacity to use this metaphor seems an important aspect 
of failure to conceptualize the mind. 
8. Metaphoric representation and the mind-body problem: the problem of other minds and the 
problem of consciousness. 
The use of the metaphor of the mind as a container thus seems integral to our way of thinking about the 
mind, and also liable to go wrong in certain ways. Let us now consider the role of this metaphor in 
philosophy. 
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Philosophical thinking about the mind has been dominated by two related problems: the problem of 
consciousness, and the problem of other minds. We can think of these problems as arising as follows: the 
experiences which present the world to us seem to be internal to the mind, whereas the world which they 
present seems external to it. Thus when I feel pain or see a tree, the experience of pain, or the visual 
impression of the tree (and the visual field of which it is a part) are internal to me, and hence presented in 
introspection, whereas the tree itself, by contrast, is part of the external world. These internal experiences, 
moreover, seem to have a phenomenal character, which we cannot envisage being possessed by any 
external physical thing. This character seems subjective, in the sense that what it is, is wholly and fully 
presented in how it seems in introspection; whereas an external physical thing like a tree is objective, in 
the sense that there is a potentially rich distinction between how it seems in perception and how it is in 
itself. Finally, the internal experience seems private, in the sense that it can be introspected or 
apprehended only by one person, the person to whose mind it is internal, whereas a physical thing is 
public, in the sense that in the sense that it can be perceived and hence known about by more than one 
person. 
Taking the case of visual perception, we can present these contrasts in the form of a diagram as follows: 
  
Figure 2: The dualistic image of the mind. 
The oppositions diagrammed here seem conceptual or logical. It seems a part of our way of thinking 
about these matters that no one thing could be both internal to the mind in the way experiences are, and 
also external to it in the way physical things are; and likewise that the same thing could not be both 
introspectible and externally perceiveable, phenomenal and physical, subjective and objective, or private 
and public. Hence this picture gives rise to dualism, the view that mental phenomena are not physical 
phenomena, and hence that human experience does not, as we have every scientific reason to believe, go 
on in the brain or nervous system. Also, and connectedly, it gives rise to the problem of consciousness, 
and that of other minds. 
The problem of consciousness is that of understanding how events in the brain could realize, or otherwise 
produce, the distinctive properties apparently manifested in experience. This problem is not solved by 
accepting that mental events do in fact occur in the brain, for the difficulty is precisely that of 
understanding how this can be so -- how events which occur in the brain, and hence are physical, public, 
and objective, can be phenomenal, subjective, and private, as experiences seem to be. Hence it is also not 
solved by holding that mental events can have aspects or properties which are phenomenal, subjective, or 
private, since this again is a version of what requires to be explained. Nor finally is it solved by supposing 
that we have distinctive first-person ways of thinking or modes of presentation of the neural events which 
realize our experience, although this certainly seems to be so. For the question remains, as to how and 
why these modes of presentation should render neural events phenomenal, subjective, and private, or 
make them seem so despite their physical nature. To many, therefore, this problem suggests the need for a 
new approach, or even a new science. Thus in a recent collection of articles (Metzinger 1995), the 
situation is described as follows: 
To be able to speak seriously about a science of consciousness, a number of fundamental questions would 
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have to be answered. It is interesting to note that with the emergence of consciousness private worlds -- 
spaces of inner experiences -- are opened up. These spaces, however, are individual spaces: ego-centres of 
experience that suddenly appear in a centerless universe. Each such centre of consciousness constitutes its 
own perspective on the world. This perspective is what philosophers sometimes like to call the 'first-
person perspective'. A phenomenal world of its own is tied to each of these perspectives. These individual 
worlds of experience also possess a historical dimension: almost always a psychological biography 
emerges together with them -- what we call our 'inner life'. This too can be seen as the history of the 
genesis of a world, or a phenomenal cosmology: within each of us a cosmos of consciousness unfolds 
temporarily, a subjective universe develops. The first part of the problem is to understand how a variety of 
subjective universes can constantly form and disappear in our objective universe... 
The problem of other minds is also a direct consequence of this picture, for according to it an other's 
experiences are internal and private, and hence inaccessible to me and not part of the external world in 
which I locate that other. This being so, it seems I can know nothing about the other's experiences, and 
indeed can have no reason to assume that an other has experience. For if all that the other does -- all the 
ways the other's body moves, for example -- can be taken to flow from events in his brain that are distinct 
from experiences, why should I postulate anything further? And even if I identify the other's experiences 
with events in his brain, still I seem to have no access to the phenomenal character of those experiences, 
and hence might well still wonder how far they are comparable to mine. 
8. Wittgenstein's claim that these problems are due to metaphor. 
As is familiar, Wittgenstein (1954) held that philosophical problems arise, among other ways, from 
metaphors or comparisons between the way we use words in different regions of language, and applied 
this with particular effect to the problems of mind. These, he said, arose from a 'picture' of the mind: 
425. In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and once it is found the application as it 
were comes about of itself. In this case we already have a picture which forces itself upon us at every 
turn, -- but does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins here... 
427. "While I was speaking to him I did not know what was going on in his head." In saying this one is 
not thinking of brain-processes, but of thought-processes. The picture should be taken seriously. We 
should really like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what elsewhere we should mean by saying 
we should like to know what he is thinking. I want to say: we have this vivid picture -- and that use, 
apparently contradicting the picture, which expresses the psychical. 
This picture, as Wittgenstein describes it, emerges as the dualistic picture of the mind described above. In 
it the mind is conceived as an enclosed space, distinct from the space inside the body, whose contents are 
in themselves psychological and phenomenal rather than physical ('one is not thinking of brain-processes, 
but of thought-processes'), and detected by a process analogous to sight (introspection). Wittgenstein 
observed that the privacy which this picture gave to phenomenal properties would render them incapable 
of description in a public language, and so incommunicable. He took this as a clear reductio of the view, 
which he put as follows: 
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293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means -- must I 
not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalise the one case so irresponsibly? 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --- Suppose everyone had a 
box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says 
he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. -- Here it would be quite possible for everyone to 
have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. -- But 
suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? -- If so it would not be used as the name 
of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: For the 
box might even be empty. -- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever 
it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and 
designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. 
Here the argument clearly turns on an instance of the container metaphor, that is, the box which 
represents the mind. So, as we can say, Wittgenstein took the dualistic image of the mind, which we have 
portrayed in Figure 2 above, as a particular instance of the metaphor of the mind as a container, which we 
have portrayed in Figure 1. The problem of other minds is thus partly constituted by the imposition of this 
metaphor. 
Wittgenstein seems to have taken the same metaphor to give rise to the problem of consciousness; but in 
this case he does not seem to have been able to make the connection fully explicit. For example he writes: 
296. "Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of 
that that I utter it. And this something is what is important -- and frightful." -- Only whom are we 
informing of this? And on what occasion? 
297. Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of 
the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the 
picture of the pot? 
We can describe Wittgenstein's thinking here as follows. Things happen in our bodies which cause the 
verbal and other behaviour through which we express pain, as things happen in a boiling pot which cause 
the expression of steam. (The box in the previous metaphor is replaced by the pot in this.) In order to 
understand these internal events we form a representation (picture) of them in terms of the mind/body 
container (the picture of the pot). But in using this picture, we perforce represent the internal events as 
occurring, not in the physical space of the body where they actually occur, but rather as in a space of a 
distinct kind. We are misled by our form of representation, in such a way that we think of the internal 
events with which we are concerned as occurring not in the pot (the body), but in the picture of the pot 
(the metaphorical space internal to the mind/body container). 
9. The metaphor of containment and the notion of a virtual inner space. 
Wittgenstein's thinking here is very compressed, but we have reason to consider it worth exploring. We 
have stressed in previous sections how metaphorical/symbolic thinking is an important part of our 
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conceptual repertoire, and how representations of the mind as a container pervade both our conscious and 
unconscious thinking. Wittgenstein's analysis of these problems thus represents them as springing from a 
preconscious mode of thought to which we have access through other disciplines, and which we have 
other grounds for considering as significant. 
We can make his claim clearer via the notion of a virtual space. A virtual space is one which is not real, 
but an artefact of our modes of representation. We create a virtual space if we treat a space which is in 
fact only represented or imagined as if it were real. Thus we can think of the space shown in a mirror, not 
as that of the actual room, including ourselves, which is reflected in it, but as an alternative space which 
we might enter by passing through the looking glass. In this case the space through the looking-glass is a 
virtual space -- a space we can consider in detail, think of ourselves as entering and having adventures in, 
etc., but a space which nonetheless is not real. We can treat the space preesnted by a cinema or television 
screen, or that shown in a video game, in the same way; and if the representation of space with which we 
are dealing is part of a sufficiently comprehensive and compelling illusion, we may characterize it as a 
virtual reality. Taking a virtual space as a real space, in turn, is an error in representation comparable to 
concrete thinking. In this case the source for a representation is linked, not with the real or imaginary 
domain which it should represent, but with an alternative imaginary domain, taken as real. 
This in the notion involved in Wittgenstein's metaphor. Someone who insisted that there had to be 
something boiling in a picture of a pot would be taking a represented space, represented as having 
something boiling in it (the picture of the boiling pot) as a real space with someone boiling in it, and so 
would be creating a virtual space in the sense above. (The space in the pictured pot would be like the 
space behind the looking glass, taken as real.) So the idea which we are to consider is that the distinct 
inner space in which we are inclined to insist that conscious events go on is in fact a virtual space, and 
therefore an artefact of our representation of the mind as a container. Thus take the 'phenomenal 
cosmology' introduced by Metzinger above, with its range of 'individual spaces', which constitute 
'subjective universes', which appear with birth and disappear with death. The view under consideration is 
that this picture is not literally true. It is not actually the case that the physical space in the vicinity of 
persons or other conscious creatures is like a Swiss cheese, filled with other spaces of a mysteriously 
different kind containing experiences. Rather on this account the spaces Metzinger is talking about -- and 
those depicted in the figures we have drawn above -- are virtual spaces, things that we are inclined to take 
as real spaces because of the way we represent them in spatial terms. 
10. Virtual inner space and the representation of real inner events. 
Wittgenstein's comparison has a second aspect, which is that the metaphor of the mind as a container 
actually serves as a representation of events in the body. (The picture of the boiling pot, although it does 
not actually contain anything boiling, does nonetheless represent the boiling in the pot.) We can see this 
clearly in the connected case of thinking of anger as a hot fluid inside us, or representing emotion in terms 
of internal fluids generally. This way of thinking serves as a representation of things that go on in us when 
we experience emotion, and hence it serves as a representation of physical processes which are otherwise 
unknown to us, but which are in fact contained within the body. In speaking of levels of temperature of an 
imaginary emotion-fluid, for example, we seem to be indexing levels of behaviour-governing 
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neurophysiological processes, particularly those which are occurring in the autonomic nervous system. 
Since this system produces and monitors emotion-related changes in the guts, for example, it seems that 
we are mapping its activity in feeling that our guts have run cold, or turned to water, or whatever. How 
such mappings work in detail we have yet to discover, but it seems reasonable to suppose that they 
underpin the metaphor. 
As a first approximation, therefore, we can see the metaphor of the mind as a container as representing 
something inner by something inner: we can take the representation of the mind as an inner space as a 
primitive natural way of representing the working of the nervous system in the space inside the body. This 
seems to apply to the metaphoric picture generally, for the business of getting good (for us) things into the 
body and keeping bad (for us) things out of it is one of the basic things we think the brain and nervous 
system are designed to do, and this holds for animals of all kinds. This mode of representation, however, 
seems designed to work in the absence of explicit knowledge about its representational function. Hence 
the question whether we are dealing with a representation of the real space inside our bodies, or an 
alternative virtual space, will depend upon how we construe the representation in question. 
11. Virtual inner space and the apparently non-physical features of consciousness. 
This approach enables us to use the account of metaphoric representation discussed above to explain the 
features of mind which we regard as problematic. Recall that in thinking of the mind as a container, it is 
essential that we not do so in too concrete a manner. For example if we think of anger as a hot fluid inside 
us, and so actually feel the anger in this way, we still do not think that if someone's anger wells up, boils 
over, or spills out, this anger will subsequently be found spattered on the carpet. To use the metaphor thus 
would clearly be to think of anger and its locus in too concrete a way, and most people automatically do 
not do so. Rather we subtly and systematically de-concretize and so de-physicalize both the space 
occupied by the anger-as-fluid and the metaphoric fluid itself. 
This means that we tacitly treat the anger-space as a non-physical space, not to be confused with the 
actual internal space with which, nonetheless, it may phenomenologically overlap; and likewise we treat 
the anger-fluid as a non-physical fluid, not to be confused with physical things actually inside us. To say 
this, however, is to say that the anger-fluid and the anger-space are virtual entities, which we represent as 
differing from the real ones on which they are modelled. Still we can see that this representational de-
physicalization actually involves nothing which is really non-physical. Rather it flows from the tacit 
imposition of the requirement of avoiding concrete thinking (something like the invariance principle) 
upon a mapping which has both physical sources (physical fluids and containers) and physical targets 
(changes inside the body involved in emotion). Since nothing which is both real and non-physical actually 
comes into question, we can say that the apparent non-physicality of the anger-space and fluid are a sort 
of cognitive illusion, engendered by this spatial mode of representing the inner. So it seems that the same 
process might likewise account for the apparent non-physicality of the inner space and contents involved 
in our everyday conception of the mind. 
If this approach is correct, then it may be possible to see the features of experience which constitute the 
problem of consciousness as virtual properties, that is, as appearances engendered by our way of 
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representing the neural events which realize experience. This would be a substantive account of the way 
our modes of presentation generate the problem of consciousness. On this account the problematic 
distinction between the inner and the outer would be engendered by our representing experience as 
occurring in one or another kind of inner field or space -- visual space, auditory space, the space in which 
we feel pain, etc. -- where these were 'spaces' were modelled on space as it appears to us in perception. 
(This is the role of the container metaphor.) This means, in effect, that we do not directly represent them 
as in the bodily space in which they actually are, but rather use an image derived from the perception of 
space outside the body, which is therefore liable to be understood as that of a distinct virtual space. 
We can perhaps start to see this in the dualistic image of visual experience, as portrayed in Figure 2. In 
this case we seem to be representing neural events in the visual system by a straightforward mapping 
from outer to inner -- a metaphoric internalization of the space and process of visual perception itself. It is 
as if in this way of thinking of experience the ordinary space in which we see things had simply been 
transposed inside (and hence stripped of its physical substance and made the object of a further special 
sense) so as to become the non-physical, quasi-spatial visual field, which we think of as somehow 
internal. So long as we think of the mapping in question as just a mode of representation of what is inside 
the body, it presents no difficulty; but if we construe it in terms of an alternative virtual space, we 
perforce feel that the entities and properties displayed in that space are not those of concrete physical 
things, and hence regard them as phenomenal. Again, if we represent something as phenomenal just 
insofar as we represent it as perceived within a virtual internal space, then there will be no more to 
phenomenal objects than is manifested in the space in which they appear, so that what is phenomenal will 
also be subjective. So this approach may also go some way towards explaining why we feel that the esse 
of phenomenal properties is their percipi, and why these properties seem, puzzlingly, both distinct and yet 
not distinct from our apprehension of them. And finally, since these virtual properties are represented as 
perceived within the space representing a single mind, they also seem private. 
These remarks are of course only indications of an approach, and to be taken seriously the acccount 
hinted at here would require to be developed in greater detail. Still they suggest that the kind of 
metaphorical or symbolic mapping studied in psychoanalysis or as conceptual metaphor may structure our 
thinking about the mind in the way Wittgenstein seems to have envisaged. In this respect the role of 
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